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Abstract. Static analyses make the increasingly tenuous assumption
that all source code is available for analysis; for example, large libraries
often call into native code that cannot be analyzed. We propose a points-
to analysis that initially makes optimistic assumptions about missing
code, and then inserts runtime checks that report counterexamples to
these assumptions that occur during execution. Our approach guaran-
tees eventual soundness, i.e., the static analysis is sound for the available
code after some finite number of counterexamples. We implement Op-
tix, an eventually sound points-to analysis for Android apps, where the
Android framework is missing. We show that the runtime checks added
by Optix incur low overhead on real programs, and demonstrate how
Optix improves a client information flow analysis for detecting Android
malware.
1 Introduction
To guarantee soundness, static analyses often assume that all program source
code is available for analysis. This assumption has become tenuous as programs
increasingly depend on large libraries and frameworks that are prohibitively diffi-
cult to analyze. For example, mobile app stores can use static analysis to improve
the quality of published apps by searching for malicious behaviors [21,19,4] or
security vulnerabilities [18,36,16]. However, Android apps depend extensively on
the Android framework, which makes frequent use of native code and reflection,
both of which are practical barriers to static analysis. Therefore, the Android
framework is often omitted from the static analysis [45,7], in which case we refer
to it as missing. In any large software system, there are inevitably parts that are
missing and cannot be handled soundly [31].
When code is missing, one of the following desirable properties must be sacri-
ficed: (i) soundness (by making optimistic assumptions), (ii) precision (by mak-
ing pessimistic assumptions), or (iii) automation (by using human-written spec-
ifications that summarize missing code) [45,7]. For many analyses, pessimistic
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assumptions are simply too imprecise, and losing soundness is a significant com-
promise. For example, consider malware detection—a security analyst must ex-
amine every potential malware, making false positives costly, but unsoundness
can be exploited by a knowledgeable attacker to avoid detection.
Using specifications is a promising compromise—in principle, for a one-time
cost of writing specifications, the precision of the analysis can be greatly im-
proved without sacrificing soundness. However, specifications are costly to write,
and furthermore must be updated whenever the missing code changes. Often-
times, an effective strategy is to implement specifications as needed—in the
malware example, large portions of libraries are typically irrelevant to the static
analysis. Of course, determining which specifications are relevant can be very
error prone. Typically, missing specifications are optimistically assumed to be
empty, leaving open the possibility of false negatives. These tradeoffs can be alle-
viated, but not eliminated, by inferring specifications, e.g., automatically based
on dynamic information [11,25] or interactively with a human analyst [45,7].
We propose a novel appraoch that may offer better tradeoffs. Given a program
(e.g., an Android app), we first run the static analysis with optimistic assump-
tions about missing specifications. If no errors are found, then the program is
instrumented to detect counterexamples to the optimistic assumptions, and the
instrumented program is published (e.g., on Google Play). If a counterexample
is ever detected, then it is reported back to the publisher (e.g., Google), who can
update their specifications and re-run the static analysis; at this point, the pro-
gram may also be terminated (e.g., to ensure that no malicious functionality is
executed). With an appropriate instrumentation scheme, our approach satisfies
three important properties:
– Eventual soundness: If any counterexample occurs during execution, then
the program instrumentation reports some counterexample. Furthermore,
only finitely many such reports will ever be issued.
– Precision: The analysis is at least as precise as having all specifications
available.
– Automation: The analysis is highly automated.
The key property of interest is eventual soundness. The first part of this property
is analogous to the benefit of dynamic type systems or dynamic information flow
control [5,13,17]—issues are caught as soon as they occur, thereby minimizing
potential damage (at the cost of some runtime overhead). The second part says
that eventually, the static analysis becomes sound, at least with respect to all
remaining executions. Existing program analyses either have a formal soundness
guarantee or are unsound analyses with no formal results. Eventually sound
analyses are potentially unsound but are only a finite number of counterexamples
away from achieving provable correctness.
To design an eventually sound program analysis, we must design an instru-
mentation scheme that satisfies the eventual soundness property. Schemes satis-
fying eventual soundness or similar properties have been proposed for type check-
ing [20], resolving reflective call targets [8], and determining reachable code [6].
However, in these settings, the schemes are relatively straightforward—e.g., to
detect missing reflective call targets, it suffices to record the call target of each
reflective call.
In this paper, we propose an eventually sound points-to analysis for Android
apps, where the Android framework is missing. We focus on points-to analysis
since it lies at the core of many static analyses, and we believe that eventually
sound clients (e.g., static information flow analysis) can be designed around our
analysis. In our setting, counterexamples are missing points-to edges that occur
during an execution but are missing from the (optimistic) static analysis. Our
main contribution is an eventually sound instrumentation scheme that detects
and reports missing points-to edges. In contrast to previous settings, designing
such a scheme for points-to analysis can be very challenging for two reasons:
– Na¨ıvely using a dynamic points-to analysis to detecting counterexamples can
incur huge overhead—for example, [11] reports a 20× slowdown, and [35]
reports a slowdown of two orders of magnitude.
– It is often not possible to insert runtime checks into missing code, e.g., in
native code. Thus, we restrict our analysis to instrument only available code.
To address the first challenge, we leverage the fact that to be eventually
sound, we do not need to report every counterexample that occurs during an
execution. For example, if a potentially missing points-to edge x ↪→ o can only
occur during an execution if the potentially missing points-to edge y ↪→ o also
occurs, then we only need to monitor whether y ↪→ o occurs. By leveraging
this property, we substantially reduce the amount of required instrumentation.
For programs where instrumentation in performance-critical parts is required,
the overhead can be further reduced by sampling [30] or by manually adding
specifications summarizing the relevant missing code.
For the second challenge, note that because we use specifications, we are al-
ready unable to discover relationships about the missing code. For many clients,
only relationships between variables in the available code are of interest—e.g.,
Android malware can be characterized by relationships between variables in the
app code alone [19]. However, these relationships typically depend on relation-
ships between variables in the missing code. For points-to analysis, we cannot
observe when variables in the app might be aliased because they both point to
the same object allocated in missing code. To address this issue, our analysis in-
troduces proxy objects that correspond to concrete objects allocated in missing
code,3 which enable us to soundly and precisely compute client relations that
refer only to available code (e.g., aliasing and concrete types).
We implement our eventually sound points-to analysis in a tool called Op-
tix4, which analyzes Android apps treating the entire Android framework as
missing code. We show that our instrumentation typically incurs low overhead—
the median overhead is 4.3%, the overhead is less than 20% for more than 90%
of the apps in our benchmark, and the highest is about 50%. The overhead of
3 The term proxy object is ours, but the concept has occurred in prior work [7].
4 Optix stands for Optimistic Points-To Information from eXecutions.
void main() { // program
String str = mkStr();
List list = new List(); // o_list
list.set(str);
Object data = list.get();
if(randBool()) {
Object dataCopy = data;
sendHttp(dataCopy); }}
String mkStr() { // library
String libStr = new String(); // o_str
return libStr; }
void sendHttp(String str) { // library
... }
class List { // library
Object f;
void add(Object ob) { f = ob; }
Object get(int i) { return f; } }
Fig. 1. Program main (left) calls various library functions, for which the analyst pro-
vides specifications (right). Abstract objects olist and ostr are labeled in comments.
the outliers can be reduced as described above; in particular, only a few manu-
ally provided specifications are needed to reduce the overhead of the outliers to
reasonable levels (see Section 8.1). In summary, our contributions are:
– We propose a points-to analysis for programs with calls to missing code that
is eventually sound, precise, and automatic (Section 3).
– We minimize instrumentation to reduce runtime overhead (Section 3) and
introduce proxy objects to handle allocations in missing code (Section 4).
– We implement Optix, a points-to analysis for Android apps that treats the
entire Android framework as missing, and show that the instrumentation
overhead is manageable (Section 8). The largest app that we have studied
has over 300 thousand lines of Jimple code.
2 Overview
Consider the program in Figure 1. Suppose that a security analyst asks whether
the program leaks the return value of mkStr to the Internet via a call to sendHttp,
which requires knowing that str and dataCopy may be aliased. We use points-to
analysis to determine which variables may be aliased. In particular, a points-to
analysis computes points-to edge x ↪→ o if variable x may point to a concrete
object o¯ allocated at allocation statement o ∈ O (called an abstract object) during
execution. Two variables may be aliased if they may point to the same abstract
object. Our example program exhibits points-to edges such as list ↪→ olist,
str ↪→ ostr, and dataCopy ↪→ ostr, so the points-to analysis concludes that str
and dataCopy may be aliased.
Suppose that the library code is missing. For many clients (including static
information flow analysis), it suffices to compute edges for visible variables x ∈
VP in the available code; however, these edges often depend on relationships in
the missing code. Pessimistically assuming that missing code can be arbitrary
is very imprecise, e.g., we may have data ↪→ olist in case the implementation
of get is return this. Alternatively, optimistically assuming that missing code
is empty can be unsound, for example, failing to compute data ↪→ ostr and
dataCopy ↪→ ostr. Such dynamic points-to edges that are not computed statically
are missing.
A typical approach in practice is to provide specifications, which are code
fragments that overapproximate the points-to behaviors of library functions.
Examples of specifications are shown in Figure 1. For instance, because our static
points-to analysis collapses arrays into a single field, we can overapproximate
array of elements stored by the List class as a single field f.
Suppose that the analyst has provided specifications for frequently used li-
brary functions such as mkStr and sendHttp, but a long tail of specifications re-
main missing, including those for add and get. Therefore, the (optimistic) static
information flow analysis incorrectly concludes that dataCopy cannot point to
str, and that mkStr therefore does not leak to the Internet. Furthermore, dy-
namic information flow control cannot be applied since the missing code cannot
be instrumented without modifying every end user’s Android installation.
Our analysis instruments the Android app to detect whether counterexam-
ples to the optimistic assumption that every missing specification is empty; this
instrumentation only inserts runtime checks in the available code. The instru-
mented app is published on Google Play; if the instrumentation observes that a
counterexample occurs during an execution, then it reports it back to the static
analysis, which is recomputed to account for this new information.
Our example program main is instrumented to record the concrete objects
pointed to by libStr and data. When the program is run:
– The variable libStr points to concrete object o¯str, so our analysis concludes
that o¯str is allocated at ostr.
– The variable data points to o¯str, so our analysis concludes that data ↪→ ostr
and reports this counterexample.
Upon receiving this report, we add data ↪→ ostr to the known counterexamples.
Given a new counterexample x ↪→ o, the static analysis at the very least learns
that x ↪→ o is a points-to edge that may occur. There are two ways in which
the static analysis can generalize from this fact. First, it can compute additional
missing points-to edges that are consequences of this fact according to the rules of
the static analysis. For example, given the counterexample data ↪→ ostr, our static
analysis additionally computes its consequence dataCopy ↪→ ostr, and determines
that str and dataCopy may be aliased. Thus, the security analyst learns that
the return value of mkStr may leak to the Internet, and can report any newly
discovered bugs to the developer. In this case, the leak is discovered even if
randBool returns false and the data is not leaked in that specific execution.
Second, the static analysis can also attempt to use specification inference to
try and identify which missing specification may have been the “cause” of the
missing points-to edge. By doing so, the static analysis generalizes the coun-
terexample to eliminate unsoundness when analyzing future apps. In Section 5,
we show how our tool leverages an existing specification inference algorithm to
automatically infer candidate specifications that “explain” the counterexample.
For example, given counterexample data ↪→ ostr, the specification inference al-
gorithm would infer the specifications for add and get shown in Figure 1. One
caveat is that the inferred specifications must be validated by a human, since it
is impossible to guarantee that they are correct. We show that in practice, the
inference algorithm has high accuracy.
1. (allocation)
x← X(), o = (x← X())
x ↪→ o ∈ Π
2. (assignment)
x← y, y ↪→ o ∈ Π
x ↪→ o ∈ Π
3. (load/store)
x← y.f, z.f ← w, y ↪→ o′ ∈ Π,
z ↪→ o′ ∈ Π, w ↪→ o ∈ Π
x ↪→ o ∈ Π
4. (missing)
x ↪→ o ∈ Πmiss
x ↪→ o ∈ Π
Fig. 2. Rules to compute sound points-to sets. Rules 1-3 are standard. Rule 4 adds
reported counterexamples to the analysis.
Next, we describe how our analysis instruments apps to detect missing points-
to edges. Na¨ıvely, we could use a dynamic points-to analysis, which instruments
every allocation, assignment, load, and store operation in the program to de-
termine all of the dynamic points-to edges that occur during an execution.
However, this approach requires far more instrumentation than necessary. In
particular, for eventual soundness to hold, the instrumentation must report only
one counterexample even if many counterexamples occur during an execution. If
the analysis satisfies this property, because only finitely many counterexamples
are reported, then after the last reported counterexample, the static analysis
becomes sound for all subsequent executions. Leveraging this property enables
us to substantially reduce the required instrumentation. For example, note that
the missing points-to edge dataCopy ↪→ ostr can only occur during execution
where data ↪→ ostr is reported, after which it is anyway computed by the static
analysis. Therefore, we do not need to detect or report dataCopy ↪→ ostr.
Another challenge with the instrumentation is how to handle allocations
in missing code. For example, if the specification for mkStr were also missing,
then our analysis cannot instrument libStr to determine that o¯str was allocated
at ostr. Nevertheless, we can reason about such missing abstract objects based
on observations in available code. In particular, suppose we instrument str and
list. During execution, this instrumentation detects that str points to a concrete
object o¯str. Since o¯str was not allocated at olist, it must have been allocated in
mkStr. We represent this fact by introducing a proxy object pmkStr pointed to by
the return value rmkStr of mkStr. We discuss proxy objects in Section 4.
Finally, we describe an eventually sound points-to analysis, but more work
is needed to ensure that the information flow client itself is eventually sound.
We describe a candidate eventually sound information flow analysis in Section 9;
evaluating this analysis is beyond the scope of our work.
3 Eventually Sound Points-To Analysis
We describe our eventually sound points-to analysis, summarized in Figure 3.
3.1 Background and Assumptions
Consider a program P (whose code is available) containing calls to functions in a
library L (whose code is missing). There are five kinds of statements: allocations
(x ← X(), where X ∈ C is a class), assignments (x ← y, where x, y ∈ VP are
program variables), loads (x ← y.f , where f ∈ F is a field), stores (x.f ← y),
and calls to library functions m ∈M library (x← m(y)). We omit control flow
statements since our static analysis is flow-insensitive. We let pm (resp., rm)
denote the parameter (resp., return value) of library functionm. For convenience,
we assume that each library function has exactly one argument, and that there
are no functions in P .
Our static points-to analysis, described in Figure 2, is a standard flow- and
context-insensitive analysis for computing points-to edges Π ⊆ VP × O [3];
we describe how our results can be extended to context- and object-sensitive
analyses with on-the-fly callgraph construction in Section 6.4. Rules 1-3 handle
the semantics of each kind of statement. A function call x← m(y) is treated as
an assignment of y to the parameter pm and an assignment of the return value
rm to x. Rule 4 handles known counterexamples Πmiss ⊆ VP ×O.
We initially make three simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that li-
brary functions do not contain allocations; we remove this assumption in Sec-
tion 4. Second, we make the disjoint fields assumption, which says that FL∩FP =
∅, where FL (resp., FP ) are fields accessed by the library (resp., program), i.e.,
there are no shared fields f ∈ FL ∩FP . We discuss how to weaken this assump-
tion in Section 6.1. Third, the programs we consider do not have callbacks; we
discuss how to handle callbacks in Section 6.2.
3.2 Eventual Soundness
We first define soundness relative to an execution:
Definition 1. A points-to set Π is sound relative to an execution e if no coun-
terexamples occur, i.e., there is no dynamic points-to edge x ↪→ o 6∈ Π.
Consider a points-to analysis that for a sequence of instrumented executions
E , e1, e2, . . . computes a sequence of points-to sets ΠE , Π1, Π2, . . ., both
indexed by the natural numbers i ∈ N. Here, Πi is computed as a function
of the previous points-to set Πi−1 and counterexamples from ei. Note that the
instrumentation for ei+1 can be chosen adaptively based on Πi and that Πi ⊆ Πj
if ei, ej is a subsequence of E.
Definition 2. The points-to analysis is eventually sound if for any sequence
E of executions Πi is sound relative to executions e1, . . . , ei and there exists a
N ∈ N such that the sequence ΠE has at most N distinct elements.
A consequence of these definitions is that in an eventually sound points-to anal-
ysis only a finite number of executions can produce counterexamples.
Definition 3. The points-to analysis is precise if for every i ∈ N, the points-to
set Πi is a subset of the points-to set computed by analyzing the implementation
of the missing code.
Note that while progress towards soundness is guaranteed, it is not possible
to report how many sources of unsoundness remain at any point in time; in
general, even if all program paths are executed, there may be missing points-to
edges. For example, in the following code, suppose that foo is missing; then, if
randInt never evaluates to 0, the points-to edge y ↪→ o remains missing:
void main() { // program
Object x = new Object(); // o
Object y = foo(x); }
Object foo(Object ob) { // library
Object[] arr = new Object[2];
arr[0] = ob;
return arr[randInt()]; }
Despite the inability to quantify progress, the property of eventual soundness
is useful, since it guarantees that only a finite number of counterexamples can
possibly occur. Otherwise, it is possible that counterexamples could continue to
be reported forever and that the static analysis never reaches soundness. For
example, suppose we try to construct an eventually sound interval analysis for a
program x← m() with an integral variable x by abstracting a set of counterex-
amples with the smallest interval that contains all the counterexamples. Such an
analysis is not eventually sound. On the other hand, an analysis that abstracts
counterexamples with (−∞,∞) is sound and therefore (vacuously) eventually
sound. Finally, the former analysis is eventually sound (but not precise) if after
N counterexamples the analysis outputs (−∞,∞).
Also, it is permissible for a counterexample to simply never occur in any
execution, e.g., in the above code, if the call to randInt in foo always returns
1, then the counterexample y ↪→ o never occurs during any execution. However,
eventual soundness is still satisfied since soundness is defined relative to the
sequence of observed executions: if a counterexample exists but is never observed,
then the analysis is still sound for all executions that are observed.
3.3 Na¨ıve Algorithm
We first describe a na¨ıve eventually sound points-to analysis. Recall that we
cannot compute points-to edges for variables in missing code—our analysis only
computes edges for visible variables in the program.
Optimistic analysis. We use the static analysis in Figure 2 to compute static
points-to edges Π, assuming that calls to library functions are no-ops—i.e., the
set of counterexamples is initially empty, i.e., Πmiss ← ∅.
Runtime checks. A monitor is instrumentation added to a statement x ← ∗
(where ∗ stands for any valid subexpression). After executing this statement,
the monitor issues a report (x ← ∗, o¯), i.e., it records the value of the concrete
object o¯ pointed to by x after executing x← ∗. A monitoring scheme M is a set
of statements in the program to be monitored. Our goal is to design monitoring
schemes that satisfy the following property:
Definition 4. We say a monitoring scheme M is sound if (i) for any execution
where some counterexamples occur, M reports one of them, and (ii) M only
reports counterexamples, i.e., it does not report false positives.
Na¨ıvely, it is sound to monitor every variable x ∈ VP . Then, we can map
each concrete object o¯ to its allocation:
Definition 5. An abstract object mapping for an execution is a mapping o¯ o,
where o¯ is a concrete object allocated at abstract object o.
For every report (x ← X(), o¯), we add o¯  o to our abstract object mapping,
where o = (x← X()). Then, for every report (x← ∗, o¯) and o¯ o, we conclude
that x ↪→ o occurred dynamically, and if missing, report it as a counterexam-
ple. In our example, we monitor libStr, detect that o¯str  ostr, and report
counterexamples data ↪→ o¯str and (if randBool returns true) dataCopy ↪→ o¯str.
Updating the static analysis. We add every reported counterexample to Πmiss.
Our static analysis in Figure 2 adds Πmiss to Π and computes the consequences
of these added edges. Continuing our example, assuming randBool returns false,
and only data ↪→ ostr is reported. Our static analysis adds data ↪→ ostr to Π
(rule 4) as well as its consequence dataCopy ↪→ ostr (rule 2).
Guarantees. Let Π∗ be the points-to edges computed using Πmiss = Π∗miss, where
Π∗miss is the set of all missing points-to edges. Then, our analysis is:
– Eventually sound: SinceΠ∗miss is finite, only finitely many counterexamples
are ever reported. Therefore, Π is sound for all executions following the last
reported counterexample.
– Precise: Any sound set of points-to edges Π ′ must contain the missing
points-to edges Π∗miss. Therefore, Πmiss ⊆ Π∗miss ⊆ Π ′, so Π ⊆ Π∗ ⊆ Π ′.
– Automatic: Our static analysis requires no human input.
In our example, the computed static points-to set Π is sound once the coun-
terexample data ↪→ ostr is reported, since the static analysis then computes the
remaining missing points-to edge dataCopy ↪→ ostr.
3.4 Optimized Monitoring
We now describe how to reduce monitoring.
Restricting to function calls. Recall that monitoring dataCopy is unnecessary—
the missing points-to edge dataCopy ↪→ ostr is computed by the static analysis
once data ↪→ ostr is reported, so it suffices to monitor data. In general, it suffices
to monitor function calls and allocations:
Proposition 1. The monitoring scheme Mmin = Malloc ∪Mcall is sound, where
Malloc = O and Mcall = {x← m(y) | m ∈M}.
We give a proof in Appendix A.1. Figure 3 shows our algorithm using Mmin.
Data Structure Rules for Construction
monitors (allocation) Malloc = OP (function call)
x← m(y)
(x← m(y)) ∈Mcall↓
reports (allocation)
x← X(), x ↪→ o¯
(x← X(), o¯) ∈ Ralloc
(function call)
x← m(y), x ↪→ o¯
(x← m(y), o¯) ∈ Rcall↓
abstract object
mapping
(program abstract objects)
(x← X(), o¯) ∈ Ralloc
o¯ o = (x← X())
(proxy objects)
(∗, o¯) 6∈ Ralloc, (x1 ← m1(y1), o¯) ∈ Rcall, ...
o¯ p = {m1, ...}↓
missing
points-to edges
(x← m(y), o¯) ∈ Rcall, o¯ o
x ↪→ o ∈ Πmiss↓
optimistic static
points-to edges
Π = (apply Figure 2 with the constructed Πmiss)
Fig. 3. Given a program P , Optix adds monitors to P . It uses reports issued by these
monitors during executions to compute the counterexamples Πmiss, which the static
analysis in Figure 2 uses to compute optimistic points-to edges Π ⊆ VP × (OP ∪ P).
Restricting to leaked abstract objects. We can further reduce the size of Malloc.
In particular, library functions can only access abstract objects reachable from
the parameter y of a call x← m(y), which implies that the return value rm can
only point to such an abstract object o. Thus, it suffices to restrict Malloc to
include abstract objects that may leak into missing code.
In fact, it is even sound to use the monitoring scheme M˜alloc, which monitors
allocation statements o such that o may be explicitly passed to the library via a
function call x← m(y), where y ↪→ o:
M˜alloc = {o ∈ O | y ↪→ o ∈ Π where x← m(y)}.
This monitoring scheme is subtler than the schemes described previously, since
the monitors M˜alloc depend on the current points-to edges Π. Therefore, the
instrumentation may need to be updated when counterexamples are reported
and Π is updated. In particular, if y ↪→ o is newly added to Π, where x← m(y),
then o is added to M˜alloc so the instrumentation must be updated.
We can soundly use M˜min = M˜alloc ∪Mcall:
Proposition 2. Let M˜min be constructed using the current points-to edges Π,
and suppose the program is instrumented using M˜min. If any counterexample
occurs during execution, then some counterexample is reported.
We give a proof in Appendix A.2. Since the number of possible counterexam-
ples is still finite, at some point no further counterexamples are reported. By
Proposition 2, no counterexamples occur in any subsequent executions, i.e., Π
is sound for all subsequent executions.
Minimality Our monitoring scheme is minimal in the following sense:
Proposition 3. Assume that the rules used to compute M˜alloc do not generate
any false positives, i.e., for every allocation o ∈ M˜alloc, there exists an execu-
tion during which a concrete object allocated at o is passed as an argument to
a library function. Then, for any strict subset M ( M˜min, there exist imple-
mentations of the library and program executions such that M fails to report a
counterexample, i.e., using M is not eventually sound.
In other words, our monitoring scheme is minimal except for potential impreci-
sion when computing M˜alloc. We give a proof in Appendix A.3.
4 Abstract Objects in the Library
We now remove the assumption that no allocations occur inside missing code.
4.1 Proxy Objects
Suppose that allocations can occur inside library code. Let O = OP ∪OL, where
abstract objects in OP are in available code and abstract objects in OL are
in missing code. Then, our analysis cannot compute points-to edges x ↪→ o,
where o ∈ OL. As described previously, we assume that the static analysis only
needs to compute relations involving program values. However, points-to edges
x ↪→ o ∈ VP × OL (i.e., x is in the program but o is not) are often needed to
compute relations between program variables, e.g., aliasing and concrete types.
For example, in Figure 1, if mkStr is missing, then ostr is missing, so our
static analysis cannot compute str ↪→ ostr (among others). Furthermore, we
do not assume the ability to instrument missing code, so we cannot dynamically
detect these points-to edges. However, this points-to edge is needed to determine
that str may have type String, and that str and data may be aliased.
We handle allocations in library code by constructing the following:
Definition 6. A proxy object mapping φ maps o¯  p, where o¯ is a concrete
object allocated in missing code, and p = φ(o¯) ∈ P is a fresh abstract object
called a proxy object ; here, P is the set of all proxy objects.
In other words, φ is the abstract object mapping for concrete objects allocated
in missing code. We describe how to construct φ and P below.
Given φ, our analysis proceeds as before. It makes optimistic assumptions,
initializes Πmiss ← ∅, and instruments the program using the monitoring scheme
M˜min defined in Proposition 1. For any report (x ← ∗, o¯), if o¯ is not allocated
at a visible allocation, our analysis concludes that o¯ must have been allocated
in missing code, so it adds o¯  p = φ(o¯) to the abstract object mapping.
Now, if a detected dynamic points-to edge x ↪→ p is missing, it is reported as a
counterexample and added to Πmiss ⊆ VP×(OP ∪P), and Π is recomputed using
the static analysis in Figure 2. If P is finite, then this approach is eventually
sound, since there can only be a finite number of counterexamples x ↪→ p.
In our example, str is monitored since mkStr is missing. Upon execution, our
instrumentation detects str ↪→ o¯str, and determines that o¯str (allocated at ostr)
is allocated in missing code. Supposing that pstr = φ(o¯str) ∈ P, our analysis adds
o¯str  pstr to the abstract object mapping. Thus, if randBool returns false, our
instrumentation reports counterexamples str ↪→ pstr and data ↪→ pstr, which are
added to Πmiss, from which our static analysis computes dataCopy ↪→ pstr ∈ Π.
We now discuss how to construct φ and P. The relevant information charac-
terizing a concrete object is the following:
Definition 7. The dynamic footprint of a concrete object o¯ is the set of all
visible variables that ever point to o¯ during an execution.
The concrete type of o¯ may also be available to the static analysis, which we
discuss in Section 6.3. Aside from concrete types, the dynamic footprint con-
tains all information about o¯ available to the static analysis, namely, the visible
variables that point to o¯.
Then, the proxy object mapping φ should map each concrete object o¯ to a
proxy object p so that the corresponding static footprint {x ∈ VP | x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗}
soundly overapproximates the dynamic footprint of o¯ as precisely as possible.
This way, clients of the points-to analysis can be eventually soundly and precisely
computed (as long as they only depend on available information), e.g., it ensures
that aliasing for program variables is eventually soundly and precisely computed
(concrete types are eventually soundly and precisely computed using a simple
extension; see Section 6.3).
On the other hand, φ should also avoid introducing unnecessary proxy ob-
jects, or else more executions may be required for the analysis to become sound.
Two extremes highlight these opposing desirable properties:
– Unbounded P: Map each concrete object to a fresh proxy object φ(o¯) = po¯.
– Singleton P: Map each concrete object to a single proxy object φ(o¯) = p.
On the one hand, if we use a fresh proxy object for every concrete object, then
there would be an unbounded number of proxy objects, which would mean our
algorithm is no longer eventually sound (since there may be an unbounded num-
ber of missing points-to edges). Alternatively, using a single proxy object can be
very imprecise; for example, for any pair of calls x ← m(y) and x′ ← m′(y′),
our analysis concludes that x and x′ may be aliased.
We first describe an ideal proxy object mapping, which constructs P as the set
of possible dynamic footprints, and constructs φ to map o¯ to its dynamic foot-
print. Points-to sets computed using any static analysis together with the ideal
proxy object mapping satisfy the above property, i.e., that the static footprints
soundly overapproximate the dynamic footprints as precisely as possible.
Because the static analysis is flow-insensitive, the ideal proxy mapping is ac-
tually more precise than necessary. Therefore, our analysis uses a coarser proxy
object mapping computed by our analysis, which essentially restricts the dy-
namic footprint to function return values. Finally, we show that this coarser
proxy object mapping is as precise as the ideal proxy object mapping for our
points-to analysis described in Figure 2.
4.2 Ideal Proxy Object Mapping
Our “ideal” construction of proxy objects exactly captures dynamic footprints:
Definition 8. An ideal proxy object p˜ ∈ P˜ = 2VP is a set of visible variables.
The ideal proxy object mapping φ˜(o¯) ∈ P˜ is the dynamic footprint of o¯.
For a concrete object o¯ allocated in missing code, we can compute φ˜(o¯) by
monitoring all visible variables and identifying all visible variables that ever point
to o¯. In our example, suppose that the concrete object o¯str is allocated at missing
abstract object ostr in an execution where randBool returns false. Then, φ˜ maps
o¯str to ideal proxy object p˜str = {str, data}. The reported counterexamples
Π˜miss = {str ↪→ p˜str, data ↪→ p˜str}
are added to our static analysis, which additionally computes dataCopy ↪→ p˜str.
Let Π˜∗miss ⊆ VP × (OP ∪ P˜) be the missing points to edges when using ideal
proxy objects, and let Π˜∗ ⊆ VP × (OP ∪ P˜) be the points-to edges computed
using Πmiss = Π˜
∗
miss. Then:
Proposition 4. If x ↪→ o¯ occurs during execution and o¯ is allocated at abstract
object o, then x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗ (if o ∈ OP ) or x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ (where p˜ = φ˜(o¯)).
In other words, clients of the points-to analysis that only refer to program vari-
ables are eventually sound. For example, if two program variables x and y may
be aliased, then there must be some execution in which they both point to a
concrete object o¯. Then, our analysis finds points-to edges x ↪→ p˜ and y ↪→ p˜,
where p˜ = φ˜(o¯), so the alias analysis determines that x and y may be aliased.
Also:
Proposition 5. Let Π ⊆ VP × (OP ∪OL) be the points-to set computed using
the static analysis in Figure 2 with all code available (and Πmiss = ∅). For
o ∈ OP , if x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗, then x ↪→ o ∈ Π. For p˜ = φ˜(o¯) ∈ P˜, if x ↪→ o˜ ∈ Π∗,
then x ↪→ o ∈ Π, where o is the statement where o¯ was allocated.
In other words, Π˜∗ is at least as precise as the points-to edges Π computed
with all code available. We prove these two propositions in Appendix B.2. In
our example, with all code available, we compute str ↪→ ostr, data ↪→ ostr, and
dataCopy ↪→ ostr, which is equivalent to Π˜∗ (replacing p˜str with ostr).
4.3 Proxy Object Mapping
The ideal proxy object mapping is more precise than necessary. Continuing our
example, consider a second execution where randBool returns true. Then, the
concrete object o¯′str allocated at missing abstract object ostr is mapped to the
ideal proxy object p˜′str = {str, data, dataCopy}.
However, the static footprint of p˜′ equals that of p˜ (from the first execution,
where randBool returns false), even though p˜ 6= p˜′—i.e., o¯str and o¯′str map to dif-
ferent ideal proxy objects, but their relevant points-to behaviors appear identical
to the (flow-insensitive) static analysis. In fact, all information about a concrete
object available to the static analysis can be summarized by the following:
Definition 9. The dynamic function footprint of a concrete object o¯ is the set
of library functions m ∈M such that rm ↪→ o¯ during execution.
Now, we use the following proxy object mapping:
Definition 10. A proxy object p ∈ P = 2M is a set of library functions. The
proxy object mapping φ(o¯) ∈ P is the dynamic function footprint of o¯.
To compute φ, it suffices to monitor calls x← m(y) to missing functions. Contin-
uing our example, φ maps the concrete object o¯str allocated at missing abstract
object ostr to pstr = {mkStr, get} regardless of the return value of randBool. If
randBool returns true, then
Πmiss = {str ↪→ pstr, data ↪→ pstr, data ↪→ pstr},
in which case our static points-to analysis does not compute any additional
edges. If randBool returns false, then
Πmiss = {str ↪→ pstr, data ↪→ pstr},
from which our static analysis also computes dataCopy ↪→ pstr. The static foot-
print of pstr is the same either way, and also equals those of p˜str and p˜
′
str.
Let Π∗miss ⊆ VP × (OP ∪ P) be the set of all missing points-to edges using
proxy objects objects, and let Π∗ ⊆ VP × (OP ∪ P) be the points-to edges
computed using Πmiss = Π
∗
miss. Then:
Proposition 6. For any abstract object o ∈ OP , x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗ ⇔ x ↪→ o ∈ Π∗.
Furthermore, for any concrete object o¯ allocated in missing code, letting p˜ = φ˜(o¯)
and p = φ(o¯), x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ ⇔ x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗.
In other words, the points-to edges computed using our proxy object mapping is
as sound and precise as using the ideal proxy object mapping. Therefore, using
proxy objects is also sound and precise in the sense of Propositions 4 and 5. We
prove this proposition in Appendix B.3.
Finally, the following result says that the monitoring scheme described in
Section 3.4 is still sound (it follows since we can compute φ using only Mcall):
Proposition 7. The monitoring scheme M˜min is sound.
Object m_gen(Object ob) {
while(true) {
ob.f = ob; ob = ob.f; }
return ob; }
Object m_res(Object ob) {
Object r;
this.g = ob; r = ob; r = this; r = this.g;
return r; }
Fig. 4. Pessimistic functions used for specification inference; mgen (left) is fully general
(assuming functions do not access global state), whereas mres (right) is restricted to
accessing only fields of the receiver. For simplicity, we omit the receiver in mgen.
5 Specification Inference
Rather than simply adding reported missing points-to edges to Πmiss, we can
use them to infer specifications summarizing missing code, which transfers in-
formation learned from the counterexample to other calls to the same library
function. We use the specification inference algorithm in [7]. Given a reported
missing points-to edge x ↪→ o, this algorithm infers specifications in two steps:
– Pessimistic assumptions: Take mˆ = mpess for every missing function
m ∈ M, for some function mpess (see below), and run the static analysis
using mˆ in place of m.
– Minimal statements: Compute a minimal subset of pessimistic statements
(i.e., statements in the functions mpess) that are needed to compute x ↪→ o
statically; these statements are the inferred specifications.
The second step involves computing the static analysis using a shortest-path
style algorithm. When computing the transitive closure according to the rules
in Figure 2, a priority queue is used in place of a worklist, where the priority
of each points-to edge in the queue is the number of pessimistic statements
needed to derive it. In particular, each time a rule is applied in conjunction with
a pessimistic statement, the priority of the derived points-to edge is one more
than the sum of the priorities of points-to edges in the premise.
Pessimistic function. A key design choice is the pessimistic function mpess to
use. The choice in [7], which we term the general function mgen, is shown in
Figure 4 (left). Using mgen is sound assuming library functions do not access
global fields or allocate objects. However, it results in a huge search space of
candidate specifications, so the inference algorithm produces many incorrect
specifications. Instead, we use pessimistic assumptions that restrict the search
space to only consider candidate specifications that are common in practice,
in particular, that (i) do not accesses deep field paths, (ii) only access receiver
fields, and (iii) assume the receiver has a single field g. These constraints lead
to the restricted function shown in Figure 4 (right).
Proxy object specifications. We separately infer proxy object specifications of the
form (X, {m}), where X ∈ C and m ∈M is a library function. This specification
says that a new object of type X is allocated onto the return value of a function.
We infer a proxy object specification for any proxy object p ∈ P we observe
dynamically such that the function footprint of p consists of a single function m.
6 Extensions
6.1 Shared Fields
In Section 3.1, we made the assumption that no shared fields f ∈ FP ∩FL exist.
Our analysis handles a shared field f by converting stores x.f ← y and loads
x← y.f in the program into calls to setter and getter functions, respectively. To
do so, we have to know which fields may be accessed by the library. We make
the weaker assumption that the library does not access fields defined in the
program—then, our analysis performs this conversion for every field f defined
in the library that is accessed by the program.
6.2 Callbacks
Android apps can register callbacks to be invoked by Android when certain
events occur, e.g., the program can implement the callback onLocationChanged,
which is invoked when the user location changes. If callbacks are not specified,
then the static analysis may unsoundly mark them as unreachable. We use the
approach in [6] to eventually soundly compute reachable program functions. In
particular, a potential callback, is a program function that overrides a framework
function. Intuitively, potential callbacks are the functions “known” to the frame-
work. For each potential callback m that is marked as unreachable by the static
analysis, we instrument m to record whether m is ever reached. This algorithm is
eventually sound since there are only finitely many potential callbacks. Also, the
instrumentation eventually incurs no overhead—once no more counterexamples
are reported, the instrumentation is never triggered.
In addition, some callbacks are passed parameters from the Android frame-
work. For example, consider the code on the left:
void onLocationChanged(Location loc) {
Location copy = loc; }
void onLocationChanged() {
Location loc = Location.getLocation();
Location copy = loc; }
Here, loc points to an abstract object oloc. In this case, oloc is allocated in
the framework, but it may also be allocated in program code. We must specify
the abstract objects that loc may point to, or else our points-to analysis is
unsound. The code on the right replaces the parameter with a call that retrieves
loc from the framework, which is semantically equivalent to the code on the
left. Thus, we can think of loc as a “return value” passed to onLocationChanged;
by Proposition 1, it suffices to monitor all callback parameters.
6.3 Concrete Types
Some client analyses additionally need the concrete type X ∈ C of abstract
objects o = (x← X()), for example, virtual call resolution. To compute concrete
types for proxy objects, each monitor x ← ∗ additionally records the concrete
type of the concrete object pointed to by x after executing the statement. Then,
the proxy objects are extended to P = C × 2M, and the proxy object mapping
φ maps o¯ p = (X,F ), where F ⊆ 2M is the dynamic function footprint of o¯,
and X ∈ C is the recorded concrete type of o¯.
6.4 Context- and Object-Sensitivity
Our analysis extends to k-context-sensitive points-to analyses with two changes.
First, the abstract objects considered are typically pairs o = (c, h), where c is
a calling context and h is an allocation statement, so monitors on allocation
statements x ← X() also record the top k elements of the current callstack.
Second, the points-to edge typically keeps track of the calling context d in which a
variable v may point to abstract object o. Therefore, monitors on calls to missing
functions x← m(y) also record the top k elements of the current callstack.
In particular, our analysis may (i) detect that (d, v) ↪→ o¯ (i.e., d is the
callstack when v pointed to o¯), and (ii) o¯  (c, h) (i.e., o¯ was allocated at
statement h, and c is the callstack when o¯ was allocated). Then, our analysis
reports missing points-to edge (d, v) ↪→ (c, h). We use a 1-CFA points-to analysis
in our evaluation; in this case, the calling context is simply the function in which
the allocation or call to a missing function occurs. Our approach can be extended
to handle object-sensitive analyses, by including instrumentation that records
the calling context (which now includes the value of the receiver).
Finally, we can also handle on-the-fly callgraph construction—if a missing
points-to edge x ↪→ o is reported, and there is a virtual function call x.m() in
the program, then the possible targets of x.m() are updated to take into account
the concrete type of o. The instrumentation may need to be updated based on
this new information. Assuming the number of possible call targets is finite, this
approach is eventually sound.
7 Implementation
We have implemented our eventually sound points-to analysis, including all ex-
tensions described in Section 6 (using a 1-CFA points-to analysis), for Android
apps in a tool called Optix. The missing code consists of Android framework
methods, which we assume cannot be statically analyzed (since the Android
framework heavily uses native code and reflection) or instrumented (which re-
quires a custom Android installation). The static analysis framework we use
predates Optix, and uses hand-written specifications to model missing code.
Specifications have only been written for methods deemed relevant to a static
information flow client—of the more than 4,000 Android framework classes, only
175 classes have specifications. Framework methods without specifications ap-
pear as missing code to our static analysis.
Optix instruments Android apps using our optimized monitoring scheme
M˜min. It computes eventually sound points-to sets and infers specifications based
on reported missing points-to edges. We instrument apps using the Smali as-
sembler and disassembler [23]. To monitor a statement x=..., we record (i) the
value System.identityHashCode(x), which uniquely identifies the concrete object
pointed to by x, (ii) the concrete type x.getClass() of x, and (iii) the method
containing the statement and the offset of that statement in the method. This
data is uploaded to a server in batches (by default, once every 500ms), which
post-processes it to compute missing points-to edges and infer specifications. To
obtain traces, we execute apps in the Android emulator and use Monkey [22] to
inject touch events. We measure overhead using the Android profiler.
We have implemented the points-to analysis, the monitoring optimization,
and the specification inference algorithm in a version of the Chord program anal-
ysis framework [37] modified to use Soot as a front end [41]. The specification
inference algorithm is based on shortest-path context-free reachability, described
in [7]. We use a 1-CFA points-to analysis. As we discuss Section 6.4, using our
more precise points-to analysis is eventually sound. Finally, we compute an in-
formation flow analysis based on this points-to analysis. The information flow
analysis is standard—we look for paths from annotated sources (e.g., location,
contacts, etc.) to annotated sinks (e.g., SMS messages, Internet, etc.) in the
Android framework [21,4,7]. All analyses are computed using BDDBDDB [42].
8 Evaluation
We evaluate Optix on a benchmark of 73 Android apps, including battery mon-
itors, games, wallpaper apps, and contact managers. These apps were obtained
from a variety of sources, including malware from a major security company (pri-
marily apps that leaked sensitive information such as location, contacts, SMS
messages, etc.) and benign apps from Google Play Store. We omit 11 apps that
fail to run on the standard Android emulator, leaving 62 apps. First, we use
Optix to instrument each Android app and study the instrumentation over-
head. Second, we show how Optix computes points-to edges over time, and
show that the number of computed edges does not explode. Third, we show how
our analysis can be used to improve an information flow client.
8.1 Instrumentation Overhead
We evaluate the runtime overhead of our monitoring scheme M˜min described in
Section 3.4. Recall from Section 3.4 that our optimized instrumentation scheme
may add instrumentation over time. We consider two settings:
– Initial: This configuration represents the instrumentation overhead for a
new app using the current program analysis. In particular, we use the initial
instrumentation scheme where M˜alloc is constructed with no known coun-
terexamples (i.e., Πmiss = ∅). Also, we use all existing handwritten points-to
specifications, representing the realistic scenario where some manually pro-
vided information is used in addition to automatic inference.
– Worst: This configuration represents the absolute upper bound on the over-
head. In particular, we monitor apps using the worst-case instrumentation
scheme where M˜alloc contains all abstract objects that may leak into missing
code. Furthermore, we remove all handwritten points-to specifications.
We executed instrumented apps in a standard emulator using Monkey for one
hour, and then used our algorithm to compute points-to sets.
Rank
Recording Overhead (%) Data (MB/hr)
initial updated # specs worst initial worst
1 50.0 31.0 15 91.6 0.71 1.72
2 46.8 17.6 10 78.2 0.46 0.62
3 39.2 6.7 5 76.9 0.41 0.51
4 30.6 6.9 1 75.1 0.40 0.46
5 28.3 19.7 5 74.8 0.37 0.38
6 19.9 – – 51.9 0.34 0.26
median 4.3 – – 8.6 0.02 0.02
Fig. 5. The runtime overhead from recording data and the (compressed) size of the
data generated in one hour. Each is divided into initial and worst-case. The “updated”
overhead is obtained by adding specifications to the system to reduce monitoring, and
“# specs” is the number of specifications added to do so. For each column, the table
shows the largest six values and the median value across our benchmark.
Results. We show the highest runtime overheads in Figure 5 (left), including
the runtime overhead from recording data and the amount of data generated
in an hour, for both the initial setting and the worst-case setting.5 Columns
“updated” and “# specs” are discussed below. We plot the runtime overhead of
our recording instrumentation in Figure 6 (a), where the apps along the x-axis
are sorted according to the overhead in the worst-case setting.
Discussion. The overhead incurred by recording data is less than 5% for more
than half of the apps, showing that in most cases the automatically instru-
mented programs have acceptable performance. Even in the worst case, more
than half the apps have less than 10% overhead. Still, there are outliers, with
5 apps incurring more than 20% overhead with initial instrumentation, and in
the worst-case, 9 apps incurred more than 20% overhead. Unsurprisingly, the
high-overhead outliers have instrumentation in inner loops of the app; in such
cases the overhead can be reduced (see below). Finally, the amount of data gen-
erated is very small. Even in the worst case, for all but one of the apps, less than
1.0 MB of (compressed) data was generated in one hour. The median amount
of data generated is about 2.0 KB, which is negligible. Data can therefore be
stored and transmitted when the app is idle, so the overhead due to uploading
data does not affect the user experience.
Reducing runtime overhead. Any program where instrumentation is required in
a tight inner loop is particularly challenging for dynamic analysis. Standard sam-
pling techniques can be used to reduce overhead in these cases [30]. Additionally,
both M˜alloc and Mcall decrease in size as specifications are added and reach zero
when there are no missing specifications. For a given program, we can test the
program to determine which monitors are frequently triggered, and compute
which missing functions require specifications for these monitors to be removed.
Providing or inferring specifications for these functions would allow us to remove
5 We ran a small subset of apps on a real device and consistently measured smaller
overhead; the emulator gives a coarser measure of execution time that we round up.
the expensive monitors. We do so for the five apps with initial overhead greater
than 20%. In Figure 5 (left), we show both the number of specifications we added
for that app (“# spec”) and the resulting overhead (“updated”). For all but the
top app, we were able to reduce the overhead below 20% by adding specifications
for at most 10 Android framework methods; again, the overhead can be reduced
to any desired level by adding more specifications.
8.2 Reported Counterexamples
Next, we evaluate how the computed points-to edges vary over time. In particu-
lar, we show that the number of reported counterexamples does not explode over
time—otherwise, the number of counterexamples discovered in production may
be unacceptably high. Furthermore, we show that a tail of reported counterexam-
ples continues to occur for some apps, which shows that running instrumented
apps in production is necessary. This experiment uses the worst-case setting
where all handwritten specifications have been removed.
Counterexamples over time. Figure 6 (b) shows the cumulative number of re-
ported missing points-to edges as execution progresses. More precisely, for each
point in the execution trace (x-axis), it shows what fraction of reported missing
points-to edges were discovered before that point. The values are averaged over
all apps. By definition, at the end of the trace (x = 1.0), the fraction of reported
missing points-to edges also goes to y = 1.0.
As can be seen, a large fraction of reports are made early on, with about
65% of reports made within 20% of the execution trace. We expect the number
of reported counterexamples to continue to converge over time, and should not
grow substantially larger. However, the curve is still increasing by the end of
the execution trace, which indicates that more missing points-to edges are still
being reported. Therefore, it is important to continue monitoring these apps in
production to detect additional counterexamples.
Last discovered counterexample. Figure 6 (c) shows the point in the execution
during which the final reported missing points-to edge occurs. More precisely, for
each point in the execution trace (x-axis), it shows the fraction of the apps for
which the final reported missing points-to edge was reported before that point.
This curve goes to y = 1.0 at x = 1.0, but we cut off apps that have reported
missing points-to edges in the last 1% of execution.
A large fraction of apps (about 45%) report no counterexamples. About 10%
of apps report no further counterexamples after the first 5% of the trace. At
the opposite end of the trace, about 20% of apps have the final reported coun-
terexample in the last 1% to 10% of the trace, and 20% have the final reported
counterexample in the final 1% of the trace, so more counterexamples likely
remain. Again, this shows that we must continue to monitor apps in production.
Proxy object sizes. Since there are an exponential number of possible proxy
objects (in the number of missing functions), we could hypothetically continue
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
tio
n o
ve
rh
ea
d
programs
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
fra
ct
io
n 
of
 re
po
rte
d 
co
un
te
r-e
xa
m
pl
es
fraction of execution trace
(a) (b)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
fr
ac
tio
n o
f a
pp
s
fraction of execution trace
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >10
# 
pr
ox
y 
ob
je
ct
s
proxy object size
(c) (d)
Fig. 6. (a) Runtime overhead of our recording instrumentation in the worst-case setting
(black) and the initial setting (red). The overheads are sorted by the overhead for the
worst-case setting. (b) The x-axis is a fraction of the execution trace, and the curve
shows the fraction of discovered missing points-to edges that discovered up to that
point in the execution trace (averaged over all apps). (c) The x-axis is again a fraction
of the execution trace, and the curve shows the number of apps for which no further
missing points-to edges are reported after that point in the execution trace. (c) The
distribution of the sizes of the proxy objects (i.e., the size of its dynamic function
footprint), omitting footprints of size one.
to discover many new proxy objects over time. In Figure 6 (d), we show the
sizes of the dynamic function footprints of the reported proxy objects. More
precisely, we show the number of reported proxy objects (y-axis) for different
dynamic function footprint sizes. As can be seen, the vast majority (85%) of
reported proxy objects have four or fewer functions in their dynamic function
footprint. While there is a long tail of proxy objects with large function footprint
sizes, there is no exponential blowup in the number of proxy objects discovered,
ensuring that the analysis does not diverge due to proxy objects.
8.3 Specification Inference and a Static Information Flow Client
Finally, we evaluate whether Optix benefits an information flow client. We first
infer specifications using the the algorithm in Section 5, and then run our infor-
mation flow client on various sets of specifications. The information flow analysis
is standard—we look for paths from a set of annotated sources (e.g., location)
to a set of annotated sinks (e.g., Internet) in the Android framework [21,4,19,7].
We demonstrate that the inferred specifications enables client to discover more
Existing Inferred Correct Accuracy
mres 299 58 49 0.84
mgen 299 159 33 0.22
proxy object 330 422 383 0.91
App Jimple LOC Time (min.)
0C2B78 322K 3.38
b9ac05 268K 1.06
highrail 247K 1.49
game 174K 0.08
androng 170K 0.48
median 19K 0.08
Fig. 7. Left: The number of specifications inferred using each mres and mgen, and the
number of proxy object specifications inferred. Right: Statistics for five largest apps
used in our evaluation, including the number of Jimple lines of code (i.e., the interme-
diate representation used by Soot), and the running time of specification inference.
information flows. However, many of the information flows remain undiscovered
because the dynamic analysis is an underapproximation, which again motivates
the need to run instrumented apps in production.
Specification inference. We remove all points-to specifications from Optix, and
then infer specifications from reported counterexamples. Figure 7 (left) summa-
rizes the inferred specifications—a specification is correct if it exactly equals the
existing specification (or the one we would have written). Using mres is substan-
tially more accurate than using mgen, which does not infer a single additional
specification. Compared to existing specifications, we inferred 174 new points-to
specifications, of which 160 were proxy object specifications.
Furthermore, in Figure 7 (right), we show statistics for the five largest apps
in our benchmark along with the running time of the inference algorithm (the
information flow analysis runs much faster than the inference algorithm). As can
be seen, inference scales even to very large apps.
Static information flow client. In Figure 8, we report the number of information
flows and the number of malicious apps detected with varying sets of specifi-
cations (one malicious app can exhibit multiple flows). If we assume that all
points-to specifications are missing (“Empty”), then the information flow client
does not identify any information flows, whereas using inferred specifications
(“Inf.”) computes a small number of flows.
A more representative use case is where the analysis has an incomplete base-
line consisting of the most commonly used specifications (“Base”). Our baseline
contains specifications for the essential Android framework classes Bundle and
Intent, for the commonly used data serialization classes JSONArray, JSONObject,
and BasicNameValuePair, and for a few methods in java.util. As can be seen
from Figure 8, when using the baseline in conjunction with the inferred specifica-
tions, the analysis computes a considerable number of additional flows compared
to using the baseline alone (39 vs. 3). The reason the inferred specifications are
more beneficial in this setting is that an information flow usually depends on
multiple specifications—if a single one of these specifications is missing, then the
flow is missing.
Compared to the existing, handwritten specifications (“Ex.”), using inferred
specifications (together with the baseline specifications) identifies almost a third
Empty Inf. Base Base ∪ Inf. Ex. \ Inf. Ex. Ex. ∪ Inf.
specs. 0 432 189 621 371 629 803
flows 0 4 3 39 34 125 125
malware 0 2 3 22 12 49 49
Fig. 8. Comparison of different sets of specifications: “Base” includes the most fre-
quently used specifications, “Inf.” includes the inferred specifications, and “Ex.” in-
cludes all handwritten specifications. For each set of specifications, we show the num-
ber of specifications in that set (“specs.”), the number of information flows computed
using those specifications (“flows”), and the number of malicious apps identified, i.e.,
some malicious information flow was discovered (“malware”).
of the information flows. However, random testing cannot reveal all malicious
behavior, since malware developers often try to hide malicious behaviors by
triggering them only in response to very specific events, for example, at a certain
time [34]. Therefore, our instrumentation is necessary to ensure that we identify
additional malicious behaviors as soon as or before they occur, thereby limiting
potential damage. Note that we do not recover any new flows when combining
inferred specifications with existing specifications—prior to our evaluation, we
have already identified all specifications needed to recover flows in these apps.
Finally, an alternative way to evaluate the value of the inferred specifications,
we consider omitting the inferred specifications from the set of inferred speci-
fications. Doing so limits the information flow client to identify only 34 flows,
which demonstrates that the inferred specifications are crucial for finding many
of the information flows present in these apps.
9 Discussion
Dynamically loaded code. Our approach can be used for dynamically loaded
code—the dynamically loaded code is taken to be the missing code, and the
code that loads the dynamically loaded code is the available code. We guar-
antee eventual soundness for points-to edges in the available code. If points-to
edges for dynamically loaded code must be computed, then the loaded code
can be reported to the static analysis, but the analysis is no longer eventually
sound—infinitely many reports may be issued since infinitely many different code
fragments may be loaded.
Eventual soundness for clients. Our approach is automatically eventually sound
for client analyses that depend only on aliasing information and concrete types
for visible program variables (e.g., callgraph resolution). In general, missing code
can introduce unsoundness into the static information flow analysis beyond miss-
ing points-to edges. For example, consider the code
void main() { // program
int val = source();
int valDup = add(val, 1);
sink(valDup); }
int add(int x, int y) { // library
return x+y; }
which calls the missing function add. Even with a sound points-to analysis, the
static analysis would not recover the taint flow from source to sink. Sources and
sinks in missing code must be specified, since there is no way to detect whether
calling missing code leaks information out of the system or introduces sensitive
information into the system.
In general, we can perform eventually sound analysis for clients that are
abstract interpretations with finite abstract domain (at least, satisfying the as-
cending chain condition) [12], if the abstraction function α can be computed for
values in the available code based on observations in the available code alone.
In particular, for a call y ← m(x), the concrete values of x and y are recorded.
Then, we can construct a transfer function fm to be analyzed in place of m.
Initially, ⊥ = fm(α(x)) for all x; whenever a previously unobserved relation
α(y) = fm(α(x)) is detected during execution, a report is issued and fm up-
dated. Since the abstract domain is finite, only finitely many reports can be
issued, so the analysis is eventually sound. Finally, we use our points-to analysis
to handle aliasing.
The challenge with information flow is that the abstraction function cannot
be computed from observations in the available code alone, since information flow
is a property of the computation, not just the input-output values. It may be
possible to use techniques such as multi-execution [14], which keep pair of values
〈xprivate, xpublic〉 for each (visible) program variable x, where xprivate may depend
on sensitive data whereas xpublic does not. For example, the value for program
variable val may be 〈14, 0〉, where 14 is a sensitive value and 0 is a public value.
Then, we can execute add using both x = 14 and x = 0, and obtain return value
radd = 〈15, 1〉. Since these two values differ, we conclude that radd depends on the
sensitive input 14, and report that add transfers information from its argument x
to its return value radd. Essentially, this approach transforms the program so the
abstraction function becomes computable. Alternatively, existing techniques for
specification inference such as [7] may be used to infer specifications describing
how information flows through missing code.
10 Related Work
Program monitoring. There has been work using runtime checks to complement
static analysis. For instance, [8] proposes to use dynamic information to resolve
reflective call targets, and then instruments the program to report additional
counterexamples. Similarly, [6] proposes to compute reachable code by inserting
runtime checks to report counterexamples to optimistic assumptions, and [20]
uses a combination of static type checking and runtime checks to enforce type
safety. Points-to analysis with missing code is far more challenging, because dy-
namic points-to analysis incurs unreasonable overhead [35,11], and also requires
instrumenting missing code.
Additionally, [26] uses dynamic information to complement static points-to
analysis. However, their analysis is unreasonably imprecise for programs that
make substantial use of native code, since they pessimistically assume returns
from native code can point to arbitrary abstract objects. For demanding, whole-
program clients such as static taint analysis, such imprecision generates a huge
number of false positives, since every abstract object that leaks into missing
code becomes aliased with every return value from missing code. Even with such
coarse assumptions, their runtime overhead can be higher than 300%, which
is not suitable for use in production code. In contrast, our analysis is both
completely precise and incurs reasonable overhead.
There has also been work identifying bugs [27,28,30] and information leaks [5,14,17]
by monitoring production executions. Our work similarly monitors production
code to identify unsoundness that can be used to find bugs, information flows,
and so forth, but our approach differs in that we aim to use the reported coun-
terexamples to compute static points-to sets that are eventually sound; these
points-to sets can be used with any client.
Specification inference. There has been recent work on inferring specifications,
e.g., purely static approaches that interact with a human analyst [45,7,1], and
approaches that rely on dynamic traces [11]. Purely static approaches can give
certain soundness guarantees, but suffer from imprecision and rely heavily on
interaction. In contrast, dynamic approaches are fully automatic, but necessar-
ily incomplete since dynamic analysis is an underapproximation. Our goal is to
develop a fully automatic approach where runtime checks are used to detect
when specifications are missing. Furthermore, [2] enables sound callgraph analy-
sis using only information available in the library interface by using the separate
compilation assumption, which says that the library can be compiled separately
from the program. This assumption is similar to our disjoint fields assumption
(with extensions to shared fields and callbacks), in particular, we assume that
the only information about the program “known” to the library are fields and
methods that appear in the library interface. While the callgraph can be com-
puted with reasonable precision using pessimistic assumptions, the same is not
true of points-to edges.
Static points-to analysis. There is a large literature on static points-to analy-
sis [38,3,43,33,42,39]. Our focus is on the new problem of automatic inference of
precise points-to information when some of the code is missing.
Static information flow. Static information flow analysis has been applied pre-
viously to the verification of security policies [4,21,32,40,44]. All of these ap-
proaches depend on alias analysis, and many use specifications to improve pre-
cision and scalability. Our techniques for automatically synthesizing points-to
specifications can make implementing any static analysis for large software sys-
tems, including information flow analysis, more practical.
Synthesis. Program synthesis has also been applied to inferring specifications
from dynamic traces [25]. This approach requires fine-grained instrumentation
(specifically, leveraging features of the Javascript language to obtain alias traces),
but they recover all method functionality. They accomplish this using MCMC on
a restricted space of potential specifications. Our approach requires significantly
less instrumentation, but our goal is only to recover aliasing behaviors, and our
specifications are furthermore flow insensitive. There have been other approaches
to synthesizing programs from traces [29,24]. See [25] for a detailed discussion.
11 Conclusion
We have described an approach to points-to analysis when code is missing. Our
approach is completely precise and fully automatic, and while it forgoes ahead-
of-time soundness, it achieves eventual soundness by using runtime checks in
production code. We implement our approach in a tool called Optix to compute
points-to sets for Android apps, where the Android framework is missing, and
show that our approach achieves low runtime overhead and data usage on almost
all apps in a large benchmark suite.
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A Soundness and Minimality of Optimized Monitoring
We prove the propositions in Section 3.4 that show that our optimized monitor-
ing schemes are sound. First, Proposition 1 says that we only need to monitor
function call returns (in addition to abstract objects). Second, Proposition 2 says
we only need to monitor abstract objects that leak to missing code (in addition
to function call returns).
Finally, we prove Proposition 3, which describes the sense in which our pro-
posed instrumentation scheme is minimal.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We need to show that if x ↪→ o occurs during execution, then we either report
x ↪→ o or x ↪→ o can be statically derived from a reported edge. Suppose x ↪→ o
occurs because x ↪→ o¯ during execution, where o¯  o. Because we instrument
every allocation (and we have assumed that there are no allocations in missing
code), we detect o¯  o. Therefore, it suffices to show that our instrumentation
reports x′ ↪→ o¯, where x ↪→ o can be derived from x′ ↪→ o. We prove by induction
on the execution trace:
– Allocation: If o¯ is assigned to x at statement x ← X(), then o¯  o = (x ←
X()), so x ↪→ o cannot be missing (since it is derived by rule 1 in Figure 2).
– Assignment: If o¯ is assigned to x at statement x ← y, then at this point in
the execution, y ↪→ o¯. By induction, we derive y ↪→ o statically, so by rule 2
in Figure 2, we statically derive x ↪→ o.
– Load: Suppose that o¯ is assigned to x at statement x← y.f , where y ↪→ o¯′ at
this point in the execution. Furthermore, at a prior point in the execution,
o¯ must have been stored into the field f of o¯′ via a statement z.f ← w,
where z ↪→ o¯′ and w ↪→ o¯ at this point in the execution. By our disjoint
fields assumption, z.f ← w must be in available code, so z and w are visible.
Therefore, by induction, we statically derive y ↪→ o′, z ↪→ o′, and w ↪→ o,
where o¯′  o′ (note that we observe o¯′  o′ for the same reason we observe
o¯ ↪→ o). Therefore, by rule 3 in Figure 2, we statically derive x ↪→ o.
– Store: A store statement cannot assign o¯ to x.
– Function call: If o¯ is assigned to x at statement x ← m(y), then we record
x ↪→ o¯, since we monitor all such statements.
Therefore, Mmin is sound. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We now prove Proposition 2. Suppose that a missing points-to edge x ↪→ o
occurs during an execution. Without loss of generality, assume that x ↪→ o is
the first missing points-to edge to occur in the execution trace. We claim that
our instrumentation M˜min reports x ↪→ o. Our proof of this claim proceeds in
two steps:
– First, suppose that x ↪→ o occurs because x ↪→ o¯, where o¯  o. Then, we
show that o¯ must have been assigned to x via a call to a missing function
x← m(y).
– Second, we show that for any o¯ assigned to x via a call to a missing function
x← m(y), we must have y′ ↪→ o¯, where y′ is an argument passed to missing
code via a call x′ ← m′(y′) to a missing function m′.
Intuitively, the first claim says that a missing points-to edge x ↪→ o¯ can only
“introduced” into the program as a result of a call to a missing function, and
the second claim says that a concrete object o¯ can only be returned by a call
to a missing function if it was previously passed as the argument to a (possibly
different) missing function.
We show the first claim; i.e., that o¯ must have been assigned to x via a
call x ← m(y) to a missing function m ∈ M. We proceed by induction on the
execution trace:
– Allocation: If x ← X() assigns o¯ to x, then o¯  o = (x ← X()), so x ↪→ o
cannot be missing.
– Assignment: If x ← y assigns o¯ to x, then y ↪→ o¯, so y ↪→ o must also have
been missing (or we would have derived x ↪→ o statically).
– Load: Suppose x← y.f assigns o¯ to x. Then, assuming y ↪→ o¯′ at this point
in the execution, o¯ must have been stored into field f of o¯′ by a statement
z.f ← w (which is also in available code by our disjoint fields assumption),
where z ↪→ o¯′ and w ↪→ o¯. One of the edges y ↪→ o′, z ↪→ o′, and w ↪→ o
must have been missing (or we would have derived x ↪→ o statically).
– Store: Such a statement cannot assign o¯ to x.
Now, we show the second claim; i.e., that o¯ must have been assigned to some
argument y′ passed to missing code via a function call x′ ← m′(y′). Our proof
uses the points-to set Πˆ computed by including all missing code in the static
analysis in Figure 2 (with Πmiss = ∅). We cannot compute Πˆ since we do not
have the missing code, but Πˆ is sound, so in particular, x ↪→ o ∈ Πˆ reported by
our instrumentation, we have x ↪→ o ∈ Πˆ.
We prove the following stronger claim. Suppose that the points-to edge x′ ↪→
o¯ occurs during execution, where x′ is either in missing code or equal to the
parameter pm or return value rm of a missing function m, and o¯ is allocated at
allocation statement o in available code. Then, at a prior point in the execution,
y′ ↪→ o¯ for some argument y′ (in visible code) passed to missing code via a call
x′ ← m′(y′) to missing function m′. We prove by induction on the execution
trace:
– Allocation: Note that o¯ cannot be assigned to x′ via an allocation statement
x′ ← X(), since we have assumed that o¯ is allocated in available code.
– Assignment: If x′ ← y′ assigns o¯ to x′, then either y′ is also missing, in
which case our claim follows by induction, or x′ = pm′ is a parameter and
the (visible) variable y′ is an argument passed to missing code via a call
x′′ ← m′(y′) to missing function m′, so again our claim follows.
– Load: Suppose that x′ ← y′.f assigns o¯ is assigned to x′. Furthermore,
suppose that y′ ↪→ o¯′ at this point in the execution; then, o¯ must have
been stored into field f of o¯′ by statement z.f ← w at a prior point in the
execution, where z ↪→ o¯′ and w ↪→ o¯. By our separation of fields assumption,
z.f ← w must be in missing code. Since w is in missing code, our claim
follows by induction.
– Store: Such a statement cannot assign o¯ to x.
By our first claim, the first missing points-to edge that occurs during execu-
tion is x ↪→ o¯ (where o¯ o is allocated in available code), where o¯ is assigned to
x via a call x ← m(y) via a missing function m. Letting x′ = rm be the return
value m, we can apply our second claim, which says that y′ ↪→ o¯ for some visible
variable y′ passed to missing code via a call x′ ← m′(y′) to a missing function
m′. By our assumption that x ↪→ o¯ is the first missing points-to edge, the points-
to edge y ↪→ o¯ cannot be missing. In other words, we compute y ↪→ o ∈ Π using
our static analysis. Therefore, o ∈ M˜alloc is monitored, from which our result
follows. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Our proof depends on the extension to handling allocations in library code de-
scribed in Section 4. Assume Πmiss = ∅. Consider any library function return
value rm. The library function m could allocate a fresh abstract object to its re-
turn value, which would be expressed by the proxy object p = {rm} ∈ P. In this
case, the points-to edge rm ↪→ p is missing, since it occurs during an execution
but is not computed statically. Therefore, if rm is not monitored, then we would
not detect the missing points-to edge rm ↪→ p.
Next, consider any allocation o such that a concrete object o¯ is passed as
an argument to a library function m, i.e., pm ↪→ o. The library function m
could assign assign its parameter to its return value. In this case, the points-to
edge rm ↪→ o is missing, since it occurs during an execution but is not computed
statically. Furthermore, all other library functions could be no-ops, in which case
no other points-to edge is missing. If o is not monitored (but rm is monitored),
then we would not observe o in the program, so we would incorrectly conclude
that rm points to an object allocated in library code. Therefore, M˜alloc is minimal
as claimed. 
B Guarantees for Proxy Objects
We prove the propositions in Section 4 that show that the points-to sets we
compute with proxy objects are sound and precise. Proposition 4 says that proxy
objects are sound, Proposition 5 says that ideal proxy objects are precise, and
Proposition 6 says that from the perspective of the static analysis, our proxy
objects are sound and as precise as ideal proxy objects.
B.1 Soundness for Ideal Proxy Objects
First, we prove our soundness result for ideal proxy objects. Suppose that x ↪→ o¯
during an execution. We prove that x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗ (if o¯ is allocated at o, in which
case o¯ o) and x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ (if o¯ is allocated in missing code and φ˜(o¯) = p˜, in
which case o¯ p˜). We prove by induction on the execution trace:
– Allocation: If x← X() assigns o¯ to x, then o¯ is allocated at o = (x← X()),
so we derive x ↪→ o using rule 1 in Figure 2.
– Assignment: If x← y assigns o¯ to x, then by induction, either y ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗
(if o¯  o) or y ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ (if o¯  p˜). We derive x ↪→ o (in the former case)
or x ↪→ p˜ (in the latter case) by rule 2 in Figure 2.
– Load: Suppose x ← y.f assigns o¯ to x, and y ↪→ o¯′ at this point. Then, o¯
must have been stored in field f of o¯′ by some statement z.f ← w, where
z ↪→ o¯′ and w ↪→ o¯. By our disjoint fields assumption, z.f ← w is in available
code, so by induction, either w ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗ (if o¯  o) or w ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ (of
o¯  p˜). Furthermore, by induction, either y ↪→ o′ ∈ Π˜∗ and z ↪→ o′ ∈ Π˜∗
(if o¯′  o′ ∈ OP ) or y ↪→ p˜′ ∈ Π˜∗ and z ↪→ p˜′ ∈ Π˜∗ (if o¯′  p˜′). Therefore,
we derive x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗ (if o¯  o) or x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ (if o¯  p˜) using rule 3 in
Figure 2.
– Store: Note that o¯ cannot be assigned to x using this statement.
– Function call: Suppose x← m(y) assigns o¯ to x. If o¯ o, then x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗miss
is missing, so x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗ by rule 4. If o¯ p˜, then x ↪→ φ˜(o¯) ∈ Π˜∗ is missing,
where p˜ = φ˜(o¯). Again, x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ by rule 4.
The result follows. 
B.2 Precision for Ideal Proxy Objects
Now, we prove our precision result for ideal proxy objects. Recall that our goal
is to prove that (i) if x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗, where o ∈ OP , then also x ↪→ o ∈ Π, and (ii)
if x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗, where p˜ = φ˜(o¯) ∈ P˜, then x ↪→ o ∈ Π, where o is the (missing)
allocation statement where o¯ was allocated. We proceed by structural induction,
first for x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗:
– Allocation: If x ↪→ o is derived using rule 1 in Figure 2, then o = (x← X()),
so x ↪→ o ∈ Π by rule 1 as well.
– Assignment: If x ↪→ o is derived using rule 2 in Figure 2, then x ← y and
y ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗. By induction, y ↪→ o ∈ Π, so x ↪→ o ∈ Π is derived using rule
2 in Figure 2.
– Load/store: Suppose that x ↪→ o is derived using rule 3 in Figure 2—i.e.,
from premise
x← y.f, z.f ← w, w ↪→ o, y ↪→ o′, z ↪→ o′,
where o′ ∈ OP , or premise
x← y.f, z.f ← w, w ↪→ o, y ↪→ p˜′, z ↪→ p˜′,
where p˜′ ∈ P˜. In either case, by induction, w ↪→ o ∈ Π. In the former case,
y ↪→ o′ ∈ Π and z ↪→ o′ ∈ Π by induction, so we derive x ↪→ o ∈ Π using
rule 3 in Figure 2. In the latter case, suppose that p˜′ = φ˜(o¯′), and let o′
be the statement at which o¯′ was allocated. By induction, y ↪→ o′ ∈ Π and
z ↪→ o′ ∈ Π, so we again derive x ↪→ o ∈ Π using rule 3 in Figure 2.
– Missing: If x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜miss, then x ↪→ o¯ during a concrete execution, where
o¯ was allocated at o. Therefore, any sound points-to analysis must compute
x ↪→ o.
Second, we prove the claim for x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗:
– Allocation: We cannot derive x ↪→ p˜ using rule 1 in Figure 2.
– Assignment: If x ↪→ p˜ is derived using rule 2 in Figure 2, then x ← y and
y ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗. Suppose that p˜ = φ˜(o¯), and o¯ is allocated at statement o. By
induction, y ↪→ o ∈ Π, so we derive x ↪→ o ∈ Π using rule 2 in Figure 2.
– Load/store: Suppose that x ↪→ p˜ is derived using rule 3 in Figure 2—i.e.,
from premise
x← y.f, z.f ← w, w ↪→ p˜, y ↪→ o′, z ↪→ o′,
where o′ ∈ OP , or premise
x← y.f, z.f ← w, w ↪→ p˜, y ↪→ p˜′, z ↪→ p˜′,
where p˜′ ∈ P˜. In either case, by induction, w ↪→ o ∈ Π, where p˜ = φ˜(o¯) and
o is the statement at which o¯ is allocated. In the former case, by induction,
y ↪→ o′ ∈ Π and z ↪→ o′ ∈ Π, so we derive x ↪→ o ∈ Π using rule 3 in
Figure 2. In the latter case, let o′ be the allocation statement of o¯′, where
p˜′ = φ˜(o¯′). By induction, y ↪→ o′ ∈ Π and z ↪→ o′ ∈ Π, so we again derive
x ↪→ o ∈ Π using rule 3 in Figure 2.
The result follows. 
B.3 Soundness and Precision for Proxy Objects
In this section, we prove Proposition 6, which essentially says that our proxy
object φ mapping is as precise as the ideal proxy object mapping φ˜. Suppose
that p˜ = φ˜(o¯) and p = φ(o¯) for concrete object o¯. We prove that x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ if
and only if x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗.
First, we prove that if x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ (resp., x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗), then x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗
(resp., x ↪→ o ∈ Π∗). We proceed by structural induction on the derivation of
x ↪→ p˜ (resp., x ↪→ o) in Π˜∗:
– Allocation: Note that x ↪→ p˜ cannot be derived using rule 1 in Figure 2 since
it only applies to allocations o ∈ OP . For x ↪→ o, we must have o = (x ←
X()), in which case we derive x ↪→ o ∈ Π∗ as well using rule 1.
– Assignment: If x ↪→ p˜ (resp., x ↪→ o) is derived from x← y, then y ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗
(resp., y ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗), so by induction y ↪→ p ∈ Π∗ (resp., y ↪→ o ∈ Π∗).
Therefore, we derive x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗ (resp., x ↪→ o ∈ Π∗) using rule 2 in
Figure 2.
– Load/store: Suppose x ↪→ p˜ is derived using rule 3 in Figure 2 from premise
x← y.f, z.f ← w, y ↪→ p˜′ ∈ Π˜∗, z ↪→ p˜′ ∈ Π˜∗, w ↪→ p˜,
where p˜′ = φ˜(o¯′) ∈ P˜. Let p′ = φ(o¯′). Then, by induction, we derive y ↪→
p′ ∈ Π∗, z ↪→ p′ ∈ Π∗, and w ↪→ p ∈ Π∗, so we derive x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗ using
rule 3 in Figure 2. The cases where p˜ is instead o ∈ OP and/or p˜′ is instead
o′ ∈ OP follow similarly.
– Missing: Suppose x ↪→ p˜ is derived using rule 4 in Figure 2, so x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗miss.
Then, x is in the dynamic footprint of o¯ (i.e., x ↪→ o¯ during execution).
We show below that if x is in the dynamic footprint of o¯, then we derive
x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗. Note that x ↪→ o cannot be derived using this rule.
We prove the claim in the last case by induction on the execution trace:
– Allocation: Note that o¯ cannot be assigned to x using an allocation x ↪→ X(),
since we have assumed that o¯ is allocated in missing code.
– Assignment: If x ← y assigns o¯ is to x, then y ↪→ o¯ at that point in the
execution. By induction, y ↪→ p ∈ Π∗, so we derive x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗ using rule
2 in Figure 2.
– Load: Suppose that x ← y.f assigns o¯ to x, and y ↪→ o¯′ at that point in
the execution. Then, at a previous point in the execution, o¯ must have been
assigned to field f of o¯′ by a statement z.f ← w, where z ↪→ o¯′ and w ↪→ o¯.
By induction on the execution trace, we have w ↪→ p ∈ Π∗.
If o¯′ is allocated in missing code, then by Proposition 4, y ↪→ p˜′ ∈ Π˜∗ and
z ↪→ p˜′ ∈ Π˜∗, where p˜′ = φ˜(o¯′). Then, by structural induction (on the
derivation of x ↪→ p˜), we have y ↪→ p′ ∈ Π∗ and z ↪→ p′ ∈ Π∗, where
p′ = φ(o¯′). Otherwise, if o¯′ is allocated at o′ ∈ OP , then by Proposition 4,
y ↪→ o′ ∈ Π˜∗ and z ↪→ o′ ∈ Π˜∗. Then, by structural induction (on the
derivation of x ↪→ p˜), we have y ↪→ o′ ∈ Π∗ and z ↪→ o′ ∈ Π∗. Either way,
we derive x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗ using rule 3 in Figure 2.
– Store: Note that o¯ cannot be assigned to x using this statement.
– Function call: If x← m(y) assigns o¯ to x, then m is in the function footprint
of o¯, so x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗miss ⊆ Π∗.
Therefore, we have shown the forward implication. Next, we show if x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗
(resp., x ↪→ o ∈ Π∗), then x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ (resp., x ↪→ o ∈ Π∗). We prove by
structural induction on the derivation of x ↪→ p:
– Allocation: As before, x ↪→ p cannot be derived using rule 1 in Figure 2,
and for x ↪→ o, we must have o = (x ← X()), in which case we derive
x ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗ as well using rule 1.
– Assignment: If x ↪→ p (resp., x ↪→ o) is derived from x← y, then y ↪→ p ∈ Π∗
(resp., y ↪→ o ∈ Π∗), so by induction, y ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ (resp., y ↪→ o ∈ Π˜∗), in
which case we derive x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ using rule 1 in Figure 2.
– Load/store: Suppose x ↪→ p (resp., x ↪→ o) is derived from premise
x← y.f, z.f ← w, y ↪→ p′ ∈ Π∗,
z ↪→ p′ ∈ Π∗, w ↪→ p ∈ Π∗,
where p′ = φ(o¯′). Let p˜′ = φ˜(o¯′). By induction, y ↪→ p˜′ ∈ Π˜∗, z ↪→ p˜′ ∈ Π˜∗,
and w ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗, so we derive x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ using rule 3 in Figure 2.
– Missing: Suppose x ↪→ p ∈ Π∗miss, so x ← m(y), where m is in the function
footprint of o¯. Then, x is in the dynamic footprint of o¯, so x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗miss,
so we derive x ↪→ p˜ ∈ Π˜∗ using rule 4 in Figure 2.
Therefore, the backwards implication follows, so we are done. 
